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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
DESERT CENTERS, INC.,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

vs.
GLEN CANYON, INC., THEODORE
I. GEURTS, KYLE BREWSTER, and
HARRY D. PUGSLEY,

Case No.
9262

Defendants and Respondents.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The parties are referred to herein as they appeared
belo\v in an action to quiet title in Plaintiff to lands in Kane
County.
On December 1, 1957 the Defendant Glen Canyon, Inc.,
was a Utah Corporation with principal offices at 556 Gale
Street, Salt Lake City, Utah; on that date a special meeting
of its Board of Directors was held, at which a quorum was
present (R. 1-11). At that meeting a resolution was adopted
reading as follows:
"Mr. LaVey submitted a proposal from the Desert Centers, Inc., of Phoenix, Arizona, an Arizona

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

2

Corporation, to finance, build, lease, and operate a
shopping center on Lot No. 1, Glen Canyon Utah
Townsite.
"In consideration of a Warranty Deed being
given them to Lot No. 1, William B. LaVey and associates agree to pay Glen Canyon, Inc. 60,000
shares of stock in exchange for this lot. A motion
was made, seconded and passed that this be accepted."
The resolution was then embodied in a completed set of
minutes of the meeting and executed by all present. This
resolution was admitted into evidence by the pre-trial Order
(R. 12) and by stipulation of the parties (R. 132) and a
fully executed but carbon copy thereof was admitted by
the Court as Exhibit "D" (R. 141).
On December 3, 1957, a Warranty Deed was executed
by the officers of Glen Canyon, Inc., attested by its secretary
and acknowledged before a Notary Public conveying the
aforesaid Lot 1 of Glen Canyon Townsite to the Plaintiff,
Desert Centers, Inc. This deed was recorded July 2, 1958
in Book N -5 of Deeds, at Page 433 of the Kane County records. This deed was likewise admitted into evidence through
pre-trial negotiations (R. 11), and at the time of trial (R.
24) as Exhibit "A" (R. 136). The deed and acknowledgment
are in statutory form and content.
Also admitted into evidence but only cumulatively evidentiary of the facts was a pre-corporation agreement (R.
137-139), which became Exhibit "B" and was admitted at
the pre-trial (R. 13).
After receiving the deed from the defendant Glen Canyon, Inc., the President and Secretary, S. S. Gittleman and
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Belle Gittleman, respectively, of the newly formed Desert
Centers, Inc., paid $15,000.00 into an account for their contribution to the capital of Desert Centers, Inc., as they had
agreed to do in the pre-corporation agreement (R. 147).
Thereafter there was checked out the sum of $7,500.00 to
Rincon Builders and Developers., Inc. as a down payment
on the construction of a shopping center on the said Lot 1.
Photostatic copies of those checks appear as an exhibit at
Page 142 of the record and the actual checks themselve·s
together with bank statements of the contributors of the
cash and bank statements of Desert Centers, Inc. appear
at Page 147 as exhibits which were accepted by the Court
at the insistence of counsel for Glen Canyon, Inc. (R. 34,
R. 38, R. 127).
The pre-trial Order by stipulation provided that the
title of Glen Canyon, Inc., at the time of the conveyance,
Exhibit "A", by Warranty Deed to Desert Centers, Inc.,
would not be and was not attacked in the proceedings.
On April 28, 1958 Glen Canyon, Inc., by Theodore I.
Geurts as President (a party defendant) and Gordon C.
Holt as Secretary, executed a Quitclaim Deed to Harry D.
Pugsley, "Trustee", and said deed was recorded on June
26, 1958 in Book N-5 of Deeds at Page 428, and prior to the
time the Plaintiff recorded its deed.
Harry D. Pugsley was made a party defendant to this
action; however, by his answer per se he admitted that he
was a Trustee only for Glen Canyon, Inc.; that he disclaimed any personal interest in the land but held title for
the Defendant Glen Canyon, Inc. solely as Trustee and was
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neither a purchaser for value or without notice of the prior
deed to Plaintiff.
The evidence of the Plaintiff was almost entirely documentary and was largely presented and admitted at pretrial. The Plaintiff called only two witnesses, the president
and secretary of the Plaintiff corporation, for the purpose
of proving that they had put in all the cash capital ($15,000.00) of the Plaintiff Corporation. A long colloquy ensued by objections of Defendants' counsel to their testimony
which is hardly useful in deciding this case but which appears in the transcript ( R. 5-48) .
These witnesses were asked and testified on cross examination concerning their salaries as officers, the make-up
of the Plaintiff corporation's Board of Directors, and other
matters which we submit are wholly irrelevant to reach
back and nullify a pre-existing deed but which apparently
influenced the Trial Court to a view that possibly Glen
Canyon, Inc. could have made a better deal if they had their
land back. This he proceeded to make provision for. The
Defendants called no \Yitnesses except for the attorney for
the Defendants, ~Ir. J. Richard Bell, who testified concerning his observations of the endorsement on the checks (admitted as exhibits at R. 147) since those checks were not
available at the time of trial but were supplied later. His
testilnony contained assun1ptions and conclusions which
proved to be erroneous (R. 8, 9, 147).
Upon the basis of this evidence the trial Court found:
"That there is so much uncertainty and irregularity, so much inequity and unfairness as related
to Glen Canyon, Inc. as to render the entire transac-
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tion, including the alleged deed from Glen Canyon,
Inc. to the Plaintiff, Desert Centers, Inc., void and
of no effect" ( R. 17).
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE, AND CERTAINLY
NO CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE,
ATTACKING VALIDITY OF PLAINTIFF'S
DEED AND THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
FINDING IT INVALID.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE, AND CERTAINLY
NO CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE,
ATTACKING VALIDITY OF PLAINTIFF'S
DEED AND THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
FINDING IT INVALID.
It is fundamental that the regularity of a deed such
as is Exhibit "A", is presumed where the same is executed,
acknowledged and recorded and that any individual attacking the same must do so by only clear and convincing evidence. Chugg vs. Chugg, 342 Pacific 2nd 875, 9 Utah 2nd
256.
It is further elementary that a deed, whether or not
recorded, is binding between the parties. Section 57-1-6, U.
C. A. 1953. In this case conveyance by Glen Canyon, Inc.
to a "Trustee" for the grantor's own benefit had no effect
'vhatsoever.
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It is equally fundamental that there is no necessity
that any consideration passed; however, in this case new
equities arose and the grantor received consideration for
the transaction since two incorporators, as they agreed to
do in the pre-corporation agreement (Exhibit "B", R. 137139), provided all the cash ($15,000.00) with which Desert
Centers commenced business (R. 147). Glen Canyon, by the
Articles of Incorporation of Desert Centers, received 49%
of the capital stock of the latter corporation.
Further it should be observed that the consideration
for the deed recited in the resolution of the Board of Directors (R. 141) had nothing to do with cash or performance
of any pre-corporation agreement, but was in consideration
of shares of Glen Canyon's own stock to be transferred by
William B. LaVey to the corporation, presumably to become
treasury stock. The Defendants came forward with no proof
that this stock was not delivered by LaVey and the burden
was upon them to do so. Chugg vs. Chugg, supra.
No doubt the Defendants will claim a great deal for
the Defendant Glen Canyon, Inc.'s lack of a stock certificate
evidencing shares in Desert Centers, Inc. The pre-corporation agreement (Exhibit "B", R. 137) provided that the Defendant should own 49% of the Plaintiff Corporation.
Glen Canyon, Inc. now is, and ever since the organization of Desert Centers, Inc. has been, a stockholder therein,
owning 49% of its capital stock. This point may be disposed
of conclusively by reference to the following citations from
American Jurisprudence:
Vol. 13, p. 397; Corporations Sec. 319 :
"A stock certificate is not stock in the corporation, but is merely evidence of the holder's interest
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in the corporation, his ownership of the shares represented thereby, and his rights and liabilities resulting from such ownership. It is authentic evidence of the title to stock.
"A stock certificate is not essential to the existence of a share of stock or to the creation of the
relation of shareholder; the interest represented by
the certificate may be held by a valid title \vithout
a certificate. A certificate of stock is generally recognized as occupying much the same status as a
chose in action."
Vol. 13, p. 455; Corporations Sec. 398;
"To constitute one a stockholder, some sort of
subscription or contract, express or implied, is required, whereby he obtains the right, upon some
condition, to demand stock and to exercise the rights
of a stockholder. Generally, it may be said that in
the absence of a regulation to the contrary, one may
beco1ne a stockholder by subscribing for stock in
a corporation, paying the amount thereof to the corporation or its proper officer, and being entered on
the book as a stockholder, even though no stock cert1'ficate ?·s issued to him; for although a corpora.tion
1·s bound upon demand to issue to anyone who has
fully paid for stock in the corporation, it is not necessary in order to constitute one a stockholder in a
co1·poration that the stock certificate to ~vhich he is
entitled be actually issued. Nor is payment by a subscriber for the stock necessary to constitute the subscriber a stockholder."
The proceedings represented by the documentary exhibits constituted a fully executed transaction upon execution of the 'Varranty Deed on December 3, 1957.
We respectfully submit that nothing more can be proved
with respect to a corporate conveyance of land than has
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been established in this case 1. e. : ( 1) Authorization of
the conveyance by the Board of Directors of the conveying
corporation and (2) Execution and delivery of a \Varranty
Deed statutory in form, content and acknowledgment.
Certainly parol evidence cannot be received by the
Court to defeat any of these written documents which are
unequivocal, unambiguous and consistent in every respect
with the conveying corporation's ordinary course of business. It should be remembered in this connection that Glen
Canyon, Inc.'s express corporate purpose is the subdividing
and development of land and the purposes set out in the precorporation (Exhibit "B") agreement are in furtherance
of that purpose.
The rule is certainly fundamental that a Court may not
attempt to re-write a contract for the parties or secondguess the wisdom in its provisions. This is true even of executory agreements; however, the Trial Court in this case
has bone much farther than a mere abrogation of that rule;
it has modified and revised a contract completely executed
as to all of its terms.
It is significant that the Defendants called no witnesses
except their counsel. The Court should consider the fact
that the Defendants produced no evidence of any weight in
light of the holdings in Richmond vs. Ballard, 7 Utah 2d
341, 325 P. 2d 839 and Northcrest, Inc., vs. Walker Bank,
122 Utah 268, 248 P. 2d 692, which hold that acknowledgment and recording of deeds give rise to a presumption of
genuineness and due execution and is prima facie evidence thereof and must be overcome only by clear and convincing proof.
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!laving come forward with no proof the Defendants
nevertheless expect this Court to strike down a deed of conveyance which has been proved by the minutes of a meeting
of the Board of Directors of the corporation executing the
same, containing recitations therein of consideration, and
b~· a statutory deed, acknow Iedged and recorded.
If the Trial Court's judgment is allowed to stand, there
is no corporation in existence which has undergone a change
in management whose current Board of Directors cannot
look back into its predecessor officialdom and set aside some
transaction which was not as good a deal as the present
board, with 20-20 hindsight, could have struck.

CO·NCLUSION
In conclusion we respectfully urge that the Trial Court
erred in denying Plaintiff relief and in granting the Defendants judgment on their Counter-Claim.
Respectfully submitted,
OLSEN AND CHAMBERLAIN,
76 South Main,
Richfield, Utah,

Attorneys for Appellant.
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